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David Layton*

The Criminal Defence Lawyer's Role

Defence lawyers often fight to prevent the conviction of people who have
committed serious crimes. How can this role be justified? In providing his answer
the author generally accepts the traditional view of criminal lawyering according
to which defence counsel "doesgood" by ensuring that the state does not obtain
a conviction in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on
admissible and reliable evidence Ethical advocacy in the criminal context is
thus heavily influenced by a conception of justice that includes not only the search
for truth but also due process rights for accused persons. The author nonetheless
argues that defence lawyers must sometimes promote values other than the client's
best interests, and routinely bring their own judgment and perspective to bear in
addressing ethical issues. Far from being amoral automatons striving to advance
a client's interests to the absolute limits allowed by law, defence lawyers apply a
personal conception of shared professional values and so make normative
decisions that impact on the course of justice Examples discussed include the
release of confidential information to prevent harm to a third party, the process of
giving advice to clients, the handling of physical evidence of a crime and, most
especially, the cross-examination of a sexual assault complainant who defence
counsel knows is telling the truth.
Les avocats de la defense se battent souvent pour empecher que des personnes
qui ont commis des crimes graves ne soient d6clarees coupables. Comment
est-il possible de justifier ce r61e? Dans sa reponse , cette question, Iauteur
affirme accepter le point de vue traditionnel que la pratique du droit penal par
les avocats de la defense est une bonne chose car elle assure que lEtat ne peut
obtenir de condamnation en I'absence de -preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable,
c'est-,-dire une preuve fondee sur des elements admissibles et fiables. Par
consequent, dans un contexte de droit penal, I'Ethique de la plaidoirie est
fortement influencee par une conception de la justice qui exige non seulement la
recherche de la verit6, mais aussi les droits des accuses 6 Iapplicationr6guliere
de la Ioi. Lauteur nen soutient pas momns que les avocats de la defense doivent
parfois favonser d'autres valeurs que lintert superieur de leurs clients et faire
systematiquement appel a leur propre jugement et 6 leur propre point de vue
face aux questions d'thique. Loin d'etre des automates amoraux s'efforgant de
faire valoir les int6rets de leurs clients jusqu'aux limites absolues autoris6es par
la loi, les avocats de Ia defense appliquent une conception personnelle de valeurs
professionnelles communes; ils prennent ainsi des decisions normatives qui
influent sur le cours de la justice. Certains des exemples discutes dans I'article
traitent de la divulgation de renseignements confidentiels pour qu'un tiers subisse
un prejudice, de la prestation de conseils aux clients, du traitement de preuves
physiques dun crime et, plus particulierement, du contre-interrogatoire de la
victime d'une agression sexuelle dont I'avocat de la defense sait qu'elle dit la
verit6.
Of the B.C. bar and Gibbons Fowler Nathanson. Thanks to Zoe Druick, Kim Eldred, Kevin
*
Drolet, Richard Fowler, David Tanovich, Michel Proulx. Jocelyn Downie and Richard Devlin for
their input and help.
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Introduction

When Dalhousie Law School and the No\ a Scotia Barristers' Society
inited me to take part in the 2004 Wickwire Lecture, I was struck by a
certain irony in my talking to Dalhousie law students about professional
responsibility. I had attended the Law School in the mid-1980s. At that
time the professional responsibility course was optional, and I didn't sign
up. My guess is that, if it \%ere possible to do the impossible, and to bring
together people and e\ ents from the past and the present, as a student I
would not ha\e shown up to hear myself talk.
It was my loss that I did not bother much with legal ethics at law school.
But that changed once I started to practice, and especially once I started to
practice criminal lawx. In particular, I had to consider the justification for
the criminal defence lawyer's role in the legal system. It is a subject that
remains central to my professional life. Undoubtedly I have represented
people k\ ho ha e done deplorable and appalling things, things that I would
ne\er do myself and would not countenance in my family, friends or
members of the community at large. As non-lawyer acquaintances often
ask me, albeit couched in respectful terms, how can I live with myself?
I want to provide my answer, not because I believe that every defence
lawyer should see things exactly as I do, but as an exemplar of an exercise
that I am convinced every responsible la\xyer should undertake, no matter
his or her field of practice.

I. The CriminalDelence Laiwyer 'Special Role
How I live with myself starts with the standard justification that as a
lawyer I take on particular ethical responsibilities by virtue of my special
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role in the justice system. We have an adversarial system in which litigants
are responsible for presenting their own case in court. Yet this system is
highly complex, replete with complicated rules of procedure and substance,
thereby necessitating that an accused person must have the help of a
lawyer to present the case effectively. It follows, I think, that the lawyer
must loyally advance the client's position in the litigation. By playing this
partisan role the lawyer respects the client's autonomy while furthering
his or her legal rights, and ensures that the adversarial system functions
properly. Consequently, the lawyer does good simply by fighting for his or
her clients. The virtues of their causes are usually of little significance
because it is the responsibility of others in the system to present opposing
views and to decide each case on the merits.
Academics refer to this justification for the lawyer's partisan role as
the "dominant" or "traditional" view of lawyering.'The dominant view is
everywhere in Canadian law. Courts use it to explain solicitor-client privilege' and to justify conflict of interest rules? Courts also accept that a
lawyer must be a partisan advocate for the client, sometimes expressed as
the duty of zealous or resolute representation.' Support for the dominant

I. Two of the most influential arguments made on behalf of the dominant traditional \'ie\come
from Charles Fried. "Lawver as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation"
(1976) 85 Yale L.J. 1060, and Monroe H. Freedman, "'Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions" (1966) 64 Mich. L. Re\. 1469 [Freedman, Professional Responsibiliti]. See also Stephen L.Pepper. "The Lawvyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense,
a Problem and Some Possibilities" [1986] Am. Bar Found. Res. J.613.
2. The Supreme Court of Canada has released numerous solicitor-client privilege decisions of
late,
allof which emphasize the lawyer's fundamental role in ensunng a workable adversarial legal
system in which a client's
rights can be advanced and protected; see Smith v.Jones (1999), 132
C.C.C. (3d)225 (S.C.C.);R v Campbell(1999). 133 CC.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.);R.v McClure (2001),
151 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.); R v Brown (2002). 162 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.); Lavallee, Rackel
and Heintrv.Canada 0A G.) (2002), 167 C.C.C. (3d) I(S.C.C.) [Lavallee, Rackel& Heintz]; Maranda
v Richer (2003), 178 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) [Afaranda].
3. InR. i Ned (2002), 168 C.C.C. (3d) 321 at330 (S.C.C.) [Neil],
Mr.Justice Binnie explained
conflict of interest law by underlining the systemic justification for the strong duty of loyalty owed
by a lawyer to his or her client, writing: "Unless a litigant is assured of the undivided loyalty of the
lawyer, neither the public nor the litigant will have confidence that the legal system, which may
appear to them to be a hostile and hideously complicated environment, is a reliable and trustworthy
means of resolving their disputes and controversies."
4
See e.g. Neil, ibid. at 334 (S.C.C.); R. v Felderhof(2003), 180 C.C.C. (3d) 498 at 536 (Ont.
C.A.) [FelderhoA]. The Neil case is especially notable in this regard, as Mr Justice Binnie quotes
with general approval the famous description of the duty of loyalty offered by Lord Henry Brougham
in the course of his 1820 defence of Queen Caroline against a charge of adultery brought by King
George IV: "[Ain advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and
that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs
to other persons, and among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty
he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though
itshould be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion" (ibid. at 330).
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vtew of lawycring runs just as strongly through professional codes used by
Canadian law societies. Confidentiality rules justify the need to keep
client secrets by pointing to the same systemic considerations relied upon
h\ courts in protecting solicitor-client privilege.' Similarly, code provisions addressing conflicts of interest are based on the notion of a strong
duty of loyalty to the client." Other code provisions describing the lawyer's
role as advocate speak of counsel's duty "to fearlessly raise every issue,
advance every argument, and ask c\ ery question, however distasteful, which
he thinks will help his client's case, and to endeavour to obtain for the
client the benefit of any remedy and defence authorized by law."'
The idea that a lawyer must resolutely advance the client's position is
particularly potent in the criminal context. To begin with, the adversarial
system, including the right of an accused to control his or her own
defence, is a fundamental principle of justice protected by the Charter,
vith a rationale closely related to the dominant , icxx of lawyering.' Solicitor-clicnt privilege also has constitutional protection which, as we have
seen, is based on the rationale underlying the dominant view.9 An accused's
rights to state-funded counsel, counsel of choice and the effective assistance of counsel are likewise guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter based on
similar reasoning." Defence counsel's ethical duty to act resolutely is thus
inextricably linked \Nith constitutional rights related to the client's
representation at trial.
Just as important in defining defence counsel's role are due process
rights that shape the very meaning of justice in the criminal law setting.
E\ery accused person is presumed innocent, which means that the Crown
has the onus of pro\ ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'' This constitutional guarantee goes hand-in-hand with the right to make full answer and
defence, which includes the right to test the reliability of the Crown case

5
See e.g. Canadian Bar Association, Code of ProessionalConduct (Ottawa: CBA. 1974) [CB
Code], c.IV comm 1. Nova Scotia Barn sters Society. Legal Ethics and Prolc\iionl Conduct Handbook (Halifa\ NS Barristers' Society, 20011 [,.S Handbook], c. 5 Guiding Principle.
h
See e.g CB4 C,,./c,
ibid, c. Vand V1, A S. Handbook. ibid. c. VI, Via and VII.
7
See eg.CBA C,,de. ibid, c IX comm I; VS Handbook, ibid., c. 10 Guiding Principle.
8
R i Swtain (1991), 63 C.C.( .3d) 4S1 at 5li4-50 ,(S.C.C.).
9.
See generally the cases cited above at note 2,
10. S. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights anti Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act. 1982
being Schedule B to the Canada 1sf1982 (U.K.), 1982. c. II [Charter],protects the right to "life,
liberty and security of the person." See cg.
s It, (A G) v C.)R. 12003). 13 C.R. (6th) I at paras.
10-59 (ic C.A.) (',tatc-funded counsel): R. v 1h('allen (1999), 131 C.C.C (3d) 518 at 530-32

(Ont. C A.) (counsel ofchoice(' R. v.]oantste( 199)5.
102 C.C.C.(3d) 35 at 56-58 (Ont. C.A.), leave
refused 11996] S.( ( .. No. 347 (effective assistance of counsel).
II. ('hartcr,
s upra note 10, s.I lId): R. v Starr (20 10), 147 C.C.C. (3d) 449 at 540-47 (S.C.C.).
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by cross-examining Crown witnesses. _'There is also the principle against
self-incrimination, which precludes the state from coercing an accused
person to aid in building the prosecution case and operates so that the
accused generall\ need not disclose any information to the prosecution. 13
Conmersely, the accused has the right to obtain full disclosure from the
Cro\\n of all information rele\ant to the matter." Finally, individuals
charged \\ ith crimes sometimes ha\ e the right to exclude evidence, even
reliable evidence pointing to guilt. as a remedy for a violation of Charter
rights.'S
The central concem underl\ ing these and other constitutional rights is
that people must be protected from a powerful and sometimes overweening state. \Ve \,ant to limit the ability of the state to exercise power o\ er us.
We fear that absent these rights, including the assistance of loyal counsel,
the state's representatives (in particular the police) will abuse their power.
So we "over-protect" accused persons in order to keep the state in check.
This means that truth-finding is not the onl\ goal of the criminal justice
system. It means that a pivotal aspect of defence counsel's job, as all
ethical codes expressly recognize." is to ensure that the state does not
obtain a conviction in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
based on admissible and reliable evidence. Ethical advocacy in the criminal context is thus heaxilv influenced by a conception of justice that
includes due process rights and their underlying values.'_

12
Criminal Code, R.S.C. I s5. c. C-40. N ,50(3(. R. ,wSeah,,mcr
199),66 ''.C.(3d) 321 at
3SX-8y S.C.C.), R. v Osohn (1LN93. S, (..C.
(3d) 4N)I at 516-1S (St'.C.) R. v Shearing (2002),
165 CC.C (3d) 225 at 265 S C C.) [Shearing]; R_i Little
(2(4), 180 C.C.C. (3d) 476 at 480. 48788 (S.C.C.) [Lvttle].
13. Seee.g. R.v.Jones(1994).,XL).C.C (3d)353at367(S.C.C.)R. v Brown(112), 162C.C.C.

(3d) 257 at 2s,-94 (S.C.C.).
14. R v.Stinchcomhe (1991)), 6S C C.C. (3d) I (S.C.C.).
15. Charier, supra note 10. s 241 . v Stillman 11997). 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 IS C.C ),R. v
Feenei (1997) 115 CCC (3d) 129 (S.C.C.i. R. v.Buhav (2003), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 116-27

(s.c.C.).
16 The codes invariabl,, state that, to paraphrase, defence counsel's duty is to protect the client as
far as possible from being con icted except upon legal evidence sufficient to support a conviction,
and emphasize that, notwithstanding the la%%,yer's private opinion as tocredibilit, or merits, the
lawyer mas properly rely upon all available evidence or defences not known to be false (see e.g.
CBA Code.supra note 5,c. IX comm. 10; ,\S.Handbook, supra note 5,c.10 comms. 10.2 and (0.3).

17. This view of defence counsel's role gleans further support from case law stressing the need for
an independent bar. the better to ensure that the profession can act as a safeguard against abuse of
state power (see e.g. Law So( en o/ British Columbia ii laneat (2001, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at
600-602 (S.C.C.). Lavallee, supra note 2 at 43-44, Finney v Barreau du Quebc., [2004] S.C.J. 31 at
para. 1;CBA Code, supra note 5,c. XXII).
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1I. Fighting for the Client -Is
Lavyer?

That All There Is to Being a Defence

While the dominant view of lawyering has come in for some criticism of
late, " for the reasons just given I believe that it makes sense in the criminal context.' 9 Nonetheless, there is a danger in oversimplifying the
description so as to cast defence counsel as an amoral instrument of the
client whose single-minded duty is always to push the client's cause to the
absolute limits permitted by law. This completely client-centred account
of the dominant view falls flat in two major respects. First, it fails to
acknowledge that the practice of legal ethics sometimes requires defence
counsel to promote values other than the client's best interests. Second, it
portrays the lawyer as an automaton and fails to describe the extent to

18. Three of the most extensive and influential arguments are offered by American academics
David Luban, Laviers and Justice. .n Ethical Study (Pnnceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1988) [Luban, Law3'ers and Justice], William H. Simon, The Practiceof Justice: A Theors. of Law-

vers Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) [Simon, Practice of Justice] and
Deborah Rhode. In the Interests of Ju.tice - Reforming the Legal Profession (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001) [Rhode, Interests of Justice]. Few Canadian academics have shown interest
in legal ethics. see Adam M. Dodek, "Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of Scholarship"
(2000), 50 U.T.L.J. 115, Harry W. Arthurs, "Why Canadian Law Schools Don't Teach Legal Ethics"
in Kim Economides, ed., Ethical Challenges to Legal Education & Conduct (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 105. But some have written about and critically scrutinized the dominant theory of lawcring. including Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibiliv (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 1999). Randal N Graham, "Moral Contexts" (2001) 50 U N B.L.J. 77; Richard F Devlin,
"Normative, and Somewhere to Go'? Reflections on Professional Responsibility" (1995), 33 Alta. L.
Rex 924 In the criminal context, Professor Graham's critical approach to legal ethics is utilized by
Michael C. Plaxton, in "R. v Lavallee. Rackel & Heintz: Jimmy Cricket Has Left the Building"
(2002). 3 C R (6th) 253. Interestingly, in the civil case of Fortin v Chretien (2000), 201 D.L.R.
(4th) 223 at 248-50 (S.C.C.), the Court quotes with apparent approval from a Canadian collection of
legal ethics writings whose editors appear committed to re-examining the dominant view: Donald E.
Buckingham et al, Legal Ethics in Canada: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996).
19. Writers critical of the dominant view who are nonetheless willing, or at least more willing, to
accept it in the criminal context include: Richard Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals: Some
Moral Issues" (1975), 5 Hum. Rts. J. I at 12: Deborah L. Rhode, "Ethical Perspectives on Legal
Practice" (1985), 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589 at 605; David Luban, "Are Criminal Defenders Different'?"
(1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1729; Fred C. Zachanas, "Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles" (1997)65 Geo.
Wash. L. Rex 169, Hutchinson, ibid. at 22, 144-48 For an unabashed championing of the notion
that cnminal defenders are different and are justified in acting zealously for their clients see Abbe
Smith, "The Difference in Criminal Defence and the Difference It Makes" (2003), It J.L. & Pol'y
83, and Abbe Smith & William Montross, "The Calling of Criminal Defense" (1999) 50 Mercer L.
Rev 443 Contra Simon, Practice of Justice, ibid., c. 7. A recent Canadian case that implicitly
suggests that a lawyer's obligation of client loyalty may be more intense in the criminal context is
Maranda, supra note 2 at 337-38. In Maranda, the Court appears to suggest that solicitor-client
privilege is broader or more robust in the criminal context because the client is exposed to a prosecution that, "involves the fundamental values and institutions of criminal law and procedure. The rule
that is adopted and applied must ensure that those values and institutions are preserved." These
"values and institutions" presumably refer to the matters discussed above in the text accompanying
notes 8-17.
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which defence counsel are personally and actively engaged in making ethical decisions.
Let me start with the first, and less contentious, point - that values
other than the client's best interests form a part of the defence lawyer's
ethics. While case law and ethical codes alike accept that defence counsel
is a partisan advocate for the accused, they also stress that the lawyer
simultaneously owes obligations to the public and the administration of
justice. For example, courts staunchly defend solicitor-client privilege, and
yet are willing to see the privilege breached where necessary to prevent
serious bodily harm or the conviction of an innocent."' The same applies
to the duty of confidentiality found in ethical codes. 21 More generally, courts
and codes have long recognized that defence counsel may properly temper
resolute advocacy in the courtroom by reason of obligations owed to other
groups and institutions. Probably the most famous expression of this view
by a Commonwealth court comes from Lord Reid in the English case of
Rondel v 11%rslev:
Every counsel has a duty to fearlessl\ raise every issue, advance every
argument, and ask every question. howe er distasteful, which he thinks
will help his client's case. But, as an officer of the court concerned with
the administration ofjustice, he has an overriding duty to the court, to the
standards of his profession, and to the public, which may and often does
lead to a conflict with his client's wishes or with what the client thinks are
his personal interests. Counsel must not mislead the court, he must not
lend himself to casting aspersions on the other party or witnesses for which
there is no sufficient basis in the information in his possession, he must
not withhold authorities or documents which may tell against his clients
but which the law or standards of his profession require him to produce.--"
That defence lawyers owe duties to constituents other than the client, and
that these duties sometimes conflict with the client's best interests, inexo-

20.

See e.g. Smith v Jones, supra note 2. (public safety exception) R v Brown, supra note 2

(innocence-at-stake exception).
2 1. See e.g. CBA Code, supra note 5. c.IV rules 2 -3; N.S. Handbook, supra note 5. c. V comm.
5.12. There is a question, however, as towhether Canadian codes allow lawyers to breach the duty
of confidentiality in order to prevent the coniction of an innocent (see David Layton, "R. v Brown:
Protecting Legal-Professional Privilege" (2002), 50 C.R. (5th) 37). There are of course other exceptions to confidentiality that do not depend upon the existence of preventable future harm.
22. Rondel v. Wrsh .,[1969] 1 A.C. 191 at 227-228 (H.L.), For recent examples of Canadian
courts relying upon Lord Reid's words in the criminal context, see R. v Samra (1998). 129 C.CC.
(3d) 144 at 168 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Dunbar, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2767 (C.A.). at paras. 334-36, leave
ref'd [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 217; Felderhof. supra note 4 at 539-40; Lvttle,
supra note 12 at 493-94.
The limits that ethics codes place on resolute advocacy also mirror Lord Reid's position in Rondel v
Worslev; see e.g. CBA Code, ibid., c. IX; N.S. Handbook, ibid., c. 10 and 14
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rably leads to my second point, which is that lawyers must actively engage
in making ethical decisions, and in doing so bring their own judgment and
perspective to bear.
Let me elaborate with a straightforward example. My law society's
Prol(..i
imal Conduct Handbook permits me to reveal a client confidence
where there exist reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure is necessary to prevent a crime involving serious bodily harm.23 Where "reasonable grounds" exist, this future harm rule provides me with discretion in
deciding what to do. 4 This means that it is left up to me whether to
disclose. In applying the discretion, inevitably I am going to bring to bear
mv oxn views regarding the relativ\e importance of the values at stake.25
I necessarily make a normative choice based on ethical principles that
extend beyond the simple assessment of my client's best interests.
Wse can look at another facet of the future harm scenario to demonstrate the complexity of the criminal laxxver's task in acting ethically. Let's
add some specifics to the example, and assume that during a meeting my
client tells me about a kidnapping and assault being planned by one of her
acquaintances. She x onders if the information should be passed on to the
police but fears being labelled as a snitch or "'rat." As her lawyer, I have a
duty to counsel her on the advisabilit\ and risks of releasing the information.-" Accordingly, I \\,ill ascertain more precisely her priorities and
concerns. educate her as to the workings of the law and relevant non-legal
matters,"' and listen to her views. I may also giv e her my candid opinion as

21 Prolti'wnal Conduct Handbook V
kanc.uscr Law Society of BC, 2004), c. 5 comm. 12.
24
Such is the case in British Columbia, my pro%ince of practice. In numerous other provinces,
ho\seer, the future harm exception requires disclosure of confidential information where necessary
to prevent seenous bodily harm or violence (see e.g. CBA Code, upra note 5, c..I rules 3-4; Law
S)
("ti .41herta
-(
Cdc ofIl',wc
ncIaConduct (Calgary: Law Society, 2004) [Alberta Code], c. 7,
r. Sic).j VS.Handbook, supra note 5. c S comm. 5 12).
25
The rule itself
contains no guidelines for exercising the discretion, but looking to \ alues articulated more generally in the Handbook and the criminal _justice s\stem I would take into account
numerous factors including: (a) the probability that harm will occur. a'. well as its type and immediacy, I whether my client has created the risk, and if so whether he or she has duped me into
unknowingls aiding in the scheme to cause harm; (c) an\ unavoidable harm that disclosure will
cause to the client. (d)ans ads erse impact on my relationship with other clients if I am seen as a
whistle-blowcnr and le) the impact of my action or lack of action on a reasonable person's perception
of the administration ofjusticc.
26
See cg CBA ,,,h. supra note 5. c. II (competence and quality of service), c. Ill (advising
clients. \r S.Handbook, supra note 5,c. 2 (competence), c.3 (qualit, of ser',ice) and c. 4 (advising
clients) As I have already discussed, it may be that I can release the information despite my client's
instructions to the contrary. This does not, however, ob\ tate the need to canvas the matter with her
in adsance.
27. For the ethical rule permitting a lawyer to take account of non-legal matters, see CBA Code,
ibid., c.II comm. 10 and N.S. Handbook, ibid., c 4 comms. 4 10-4.13.
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to which option is preferable and \\Ilh. -2 Where the client is not exactly
sure what to do, as is the case here, the manner in which I question her and
pro\ ide information and advice may \\ell affect her ultimate decision. What
emphasis do I place on the danger of being labelled a snitch or the absence
of any legal duty on her to take positi\ e action'? How do I portray the
importance of preventing serious injury to an innocent person or describe
steps that might be taken to lessen the possibility of her being revealed as
the source of the information? Whether expressed consciously or uncon-

sciously. nix personal vieN\s ma\ well have some impact on the client's
decision. I am not an emptx \essel into which the client's aims and interests are channelled. but an advisor x hose \ ie\\ of justice including but not
limited to mx dut\ of loyalt' and the due process rights afforded my client
under the Charter is part and parcel of the la\\x ering process.>
There is another point that I want to make, and it relates to a lawyer's
interpretation of ethical codes and the law. The precise meaning of an ethical rule is often open to different reasonable interpretations on a given set
of facts. The same goes for common la\\ or statutory rules that place limits
on a lawyer's behaviour in representing a client. In deciding which reasonable interpretation to adopt. a lawyver will be influenced by many factors,
including constitutional and case law, law societ\ pronouncements,
advice from colleagues and writings on point. But he or she will also apply
knowledge gained from previous experience and from his or her own assessment of the factual context and the \alues thereby engaged. In the act
of interpretation, the defence law\ er thus has room to make his or her own
xalues felt. It is not a rote and unthinking process.
The notorious Ken Murray case pro\ ides an excellent illustration of
what I mean.3" While representing serial rapist and murderer Paul Bemardo,

2x. See e g. CBA Cdc, ibid., c. III comm. I" V.S Handbook, ibid., c 4 Guiding Principle 1. which
allow a la%\yer to express a preference as to the ad\ isablits of taking a particular course of action.
29. There is an ongoing debate as to vhether a lawyer should control the conduct of the client's
matter in a paternalistic manner, or if instead he or she should educate the client as to the interests at
stake and thereafter respect the client's autonomy by following instructions. lnformati\e readings
on point include: David Luban, "Paternalism and the Legal Profession'" [1981] Wis. L. Re\ 454,
Duncan Kenned\. "Distributive and Paternalist \loMes in Contract and Tort La\s. With Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power" (19X2) 41 Md. L. Rev. 563. William Simon. "Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy- \lr, Jones's Case", in Ethics in Practice. Lawyers'Roles, Responsibilities,and Regulation, ed. by Deborah Rhode (Ne\, York: Oxford University
Press, 2000) at 165: Mark Spiegel, "The Case of r,. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and Autonomy in
Lawyer-Client Counseling" (1997) B.U. L. Re. 307. While I fax our an approach that strives to
respect the client's autonomy to make decisions. I am not so naYie as to believe that the lawyer who
follows this model has no impact upon the decisions ultimately reached by the client.
tf urrai (2000), 144 C.C.C. (3d) 322 (Ont. S.C.J.). The tlurrav case has been the catalyst
30. R.
for a number of articles on the handling of physical ev idence by lawyers. e.g. "Forum: Legal Ethics"
(2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 167 ff. and "Ethics and Criminal Justice" (2003) 47 (rim. L.Q 121 if.
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Mr. Murray took possession of scveral videotapes that constituted physical c\ idence strongly supportive of the Crown's case and highly damaging
to Bernardo's chances of success at trial. Murray kept the tapes for seventeen months. In the result, he was charged with obstructing justice. At
Murray's trial, the court noted that Ontario's ethical code was silent on the
propriety of a lawyer handling physical e idence and that opinions in the
profession x\ere not unanimous. Accordingly, while Murray's actions
obstructed justice, the court held that he did not possess a criminal intent
because lie mistakenly believed that he \xas acting ethically. Murray was
acquitted, but the court put the profession on notice that any lawyer who
acted similarly in the future would be committing a crime. The criminality
of lurray's beha\ lour \\as no longer in doubt.
Once Murray's case was o\ er, the Law Society of Upper Canada struck
a special committee to draft an ethical rule that would cover the
problem.' A majority of the committee ended up supporting a rule that
would permit lavyers to handle ph\sical evidence in certain restricted
circumstances, and on occasion to return the evidence to its source. But
dissenters on the committee preferred a much narrower, categorical rule,
under which la\wvers \would have a single option in every case: to turn the
evidence over to the authorities immediately 32 The dissenters strongly
believed that the maJorlty's draft rule encouraged la\vyers to violate the
law as stated bv the court in the Wlurra' case. The majority just as
adamantly argued that its draft was consistent \\ ith the 1utrraY decision.33
The luIr'ra'v saga slio\\s that la\\s and ethical rules can be open to
different reasonable interpretations. The court acquitted Murray largely
because ethical rules and professional conventions were seen to be unclear
regarding the propriety of his actions. Even after the judgment, there

31
Scc Lawstoliet\ of Upper Canada, Report to Cmo( ltt
on. Special Coninittc' on Lavo's '
Diaw with R'pe, to, Property Relevant to a (rime o O/n0Icne. 21 March 2002 (superseding an
earlier report released on 22 \larch 2001 ).
32. "lorc recentl , the Nova Scotlia
lithics and Professional Responsibility Committee took the
Samc \iew in rcrommending the addition of a "ph\,ical e\ dence" commentary to the N.S. Hand-

book sec Kc%in A. \lacDonald & (rowe Dillon Robinson, "P1s ical
E%idence of a Crime: Rule,
Las, or No lan's Land", The ...iti Record 22"2 (February 21)1)4) 6. In August of 2004 the CBA
made numerous changes to it,Code, but decided against making any additions to address the physical c\idence IsuC (see "(ontroscrsiil Criminal-Law Rule Left Out ofAmended CBA Ethnics Code"
\att,,nsl
13:3 (\l~ia, 211)4) 57).
33. 1 ,ced i,ith opposition from \ictim nterest groups and the Attorne, General of Ontario, in the

spring or 2002 the benchers of the Law Socict of Upper Canada postponed debating the draft rule,
deci~ding instead to obtain independent legal ad\ ice as to the legality of the majority's approach.

Nothing since has been heard on the matter, and it appears that there no longer exists the political
\%ill to adopt a rule of any kind.
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remains a spirited debate as to the precise limits of the criminal law and
the proper ethical approach regarding the handling of physical evidence.
The result is that the lawver who encounters physical evidence of a crime
may well have room to move in deciding how best to balance the interests
at stake. The same goes tor many other ethical rules and laws relating to
defence counsel's role. In the act of interpretation, defence lawyers thus
undertake an exercise that is partly normative.

I1l.

.4 Dijicult Case: Cn. s-examination ofthe Truthflid Witness

The model of laxvering that I favour does not absolve defence counsel
from conscious engagement in ethical decision-making, and sometimes
requires a lawy~er to pull back from pure zealousness on the client's behalf.
But the extent to which a law\er's morality should be relevant can be
controversial. A hotly debated example arises when a lawyer is poised to
cross-examine a \\ itness he or she knows is telling the truth. Suppose that
I represent a client charged wvith the sexual assault of an ex-girlfriend. My
client tells me that she is telling the truth, but he nonetheless wants to
plead not guilty and force the Crowvn to prove its case. I look at the file.
I find ammunition that I can use to attack the complainant's credibility.
Perhaps she has a motive to lie. Maybe I can exploit a prior conviction for
fraud as well as modest inconsistencies in her statements to the police to
further weaken her trustworthiness. A skilled cross-examination may stand
a chance of raising a reasonable doubt by pointing to aspects of her testimony and character that suggest fabrication. This cross-examination is
probably legal, but is it ethical?
Professional codes do not yield an unambiguous answer to this
question. True, they prohibit counsel from misleading the court, 4 and say
that counsel's knowledge of guilt limits the extent to which he or she can
attack the prosecution case. 15 But the codes also state that counsel who
knows that the client is guilty is permitted to test the evidence given by
each Crown witness and to argue that the evidence taken as a whole is
insufficient to prove guilt.16 Together, these provisions undoubtedly stop a

34. See e.g. CBA Code, supra note 5. c. IX comm. 2(b), (e) and (g)i N.S. Handbook, supra note 5,
c. 14 guiding principles (b), (e) and tg).
35. CBA Code, ibid., c. IN comm 1l; N.S. Handbook, ibid., c. O comm. 0.7.
36. See the code provisions cited in the proceeding footnote. See also Alberta Code, supra note
24, c. 10 comm. 14.2. which perhaps goes furthest, stating that the lawyer with such knowledge,
whether acting in a civil or criminal matter. "may otherwise attack the case of opposing parties,
including the credibility o/ witnes.%e through cross- examination" (emphasis added).
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la\\\er from asserting as true facts known to be false - here, that the
complainant consented. But they do not clearly prevent counsel from
attacking the complainant's character in cross-examination, putting
questions to her that highlight elements of her story that could be consistent with consent, and then arguing to the judge or jury at the end of the
case, not that the client is innocent, but rather that the Crown has not proven
guilt because there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant is
7
telling the truth.
For the sake of brevi\t. I am going to call the method of cross-examination just described "aggressive cross-examination." There is not a lot in
the way of Canadian case law that helps to flesh out the ethical code provisions so as to indicate with any precision whether aggressive cross-examination is proper. "sIt so happens, ho\, ever. that the Supreme Court of Canada
recently commented on the relationship betxveen defence counsel's factual
kno\\ledge and ethical cross-examination in a case called R. iv Lvttle.39
There is absolutely no suggestion that counsel in Lvttle knew that her
client as guilty. But the Court was asked to address an issue related to the
propriety of aggressi\e cross-examination, namely, the level of knowl-

17. Canadian ethical codes contain other rule, bearing on the issue. see e.g. CBA Code, supra note
5. c IX cormi,. 1-2, 10; A S. Handbook, supra note 5. c. 10 and 14, rules and guiding principles.
comms. 10 3-10. , However, those paraphrased in the text above most directly address my specific
scenario. Contrast the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Funclion. 3rd ed. ( 1993., Std. 4-7.6(b) I -\BA Defense Std. 4-7.6(b)] and commentary, \hich expressly
condone the aggrcssi, c cross-examination ofa truthful .\ ltnes, and statc that failure to do so " here
the la%%er cannot otherwise provide the accused %%
ith a defence \ iolates the ethical duts to pro\ ide
a client sith zealous representation The first edition of the Standards, published in 1971, took a
\.cry different tack, stating that a la%%yer, "should not misuse the power of cross-examination or
impeachment by employing it to discredit or undermine a \ itncss ifhe knows the \\itness is testifying truthfull.' (emphasis added) Also see the American La\\ Institute's Restcftcnient .4 the Lao.
Thc Law Governing Lawvcir B106 ( 19O0, comment 'c', ,.%Nhichstates that esen if legally permissible a law.,er, "is never required to conduct such examination, and the lawsver may swithdraw if the
law,.er's client insists on such a course of action in a setting in which the lasi \ er considers it imprudent or repugnant" i emphasis added). The associated Reporter's Note implies that aggressi\ e crossexamination of the truthful \ ltnes, garners more support in the criminal context, and states that
comment "c'" as \sorded represents the pre\ ailing norm in civil cases.
38
The most relevant case on point is R. v. Li (1993). 36 B.C.A.C. 181 at paras. 66-68, leave
refused t 19 4), 178 N.R. 395 (S.C.C.). Li held that counsel who knew of his client's guilt nonetheless acted ethically in calling c\ idence to sho that. at the time of the robbery charged, the client's
hairstyle and fluency in I nglish ,'ere at ()lds s ith the descriptions given by two robbery s ictims. In
the court's vcw, raising a reasonable doubt as to the reliabilitx of the identification through the use
of this evidence and similar c\ idence brought out in cross-examination was not tantamount to putting up a delence inconsistent with the facts belie\ ed by counsel to be true.
39. L it/c
ti ,l l'rt note 12,
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edge or supporting c\ idence necessary to permit defence counsel to put a
suggestion to a \xitness in cross-examination.4"
The Court's short answ er was that it isunethical for counsel to put
questions to a \\itness absent a "good faith basis."'" The Court went on to
say that:
a 'good thith basis" is a function of the information available to the
cross-examiner, his or her belief in its likcl, accuracy, and the purpose for
which it is used. Information falling short of admissible evidence may be
put to the \\itness. In fact, the information may be incomplete or uncertain,
provided the cross-cxaminer does not put suggestions to the witness
recklessl\ or that he or she knows to be false. The cross-examiner may
pursue any hypothesis that is honestlh adxanced on the strength of
reasonable inference, e\pcrience or intuition. The purpose of the question
must be consistent \ ith the lawyer's role as an officer of the court: to
suggest what counsel genuinely thinks possible on known facts or
reasonable assumptions is in our \ie\\ permissible: to assert or to imply in
a manner that is calculated to mislead is in our %ie\ improper and
prohibited."
I have heard it suggested that Lvttle's "good faith" precondition clarifies
the otherw ise ambiguous ethical codes so as to sound the death knell for
aggressi\ e cross-examination by prohibiting any questions that "imply in
a manner that is calculated to mislead." But I disagree. I accept that, in
case there was any doubt, L.vttle precludes putting a suggestion to the truthful
witness that directly posits as true something defence counsel knows to be
false. "Iput it to you that you are lying to the court and that you in fact had
consensual sex wlith my client" is thus forbidden. But putting suggestions
to the witness that counsel kno\%s or suspects are true in order to raise a
reasonable doubt is a \ery different exercise. Lvttle expressly states that
the purpose for which counsel uses information bears upon good faith, and
thus upon the propriety of a line of questioning. Aggressive cross-examination simply tests the Crown's case to ensure that no conviction occurs
absent proof on the criminal standard, which does not imply that such
cross-examination is conducted in a manner that is calculated to mislead.

40. The issue arose when defence counsel sought to cross-examine sex eral Crown witnesses so as
to suggest that the complainant had falsely identified the accused as his attacker in order to divert
attention from the true perpetrators, his associates in a drug-deating enterprise rhe trial judge held
that counsel was forbidden from putting these suggestions to Crown witnesses absent an undertaking to calldefence evidence in support of the theory.
41. Lyttle, supra note 12 at 489.
42 Ibid..
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If my interpretation of Lvttle is accurate,4" then defence counsel faced

\x ith the possibility of conducting an aggressive cross-examination must
look beyond the codes and case law to examine arguments from principle.
In this regard, we can start by reviewing the justifications for conducting
this sort of cross-examination, which mirror the arguments that I have
already made in favour of resolute partisanship in the defence of an
accused.44 That is, the state, with its immense resources and a propensity
to abuse power, must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
accused has a right to test the prosecution case to ensure that the criminal
standard is met. Aggressive cross-examination simply relies on accurate
information, not falsehoods, to raise a reasonable doubt, and counsel never
states that a fact known to be false is true.15 While the practice may hinder
the search for factual truth, determining factual truth is not the sole aim of
the criminal justice system. Furthermore, in the long run, truth may
actually be better served by aggressive cross-examination, because the
police and the (roxwn will be more diligent in investigating and prosecuting all cases knowing that the defence will always vigorously test the

evidence. The chance of wrongful convictions will thereby be reduced
across the board.

A different sort of argument in favour of an aggressive cross-examina-

43. \I interpretation is of course influenced b\ my assessment of the interplay between the various values engaged. an assessment that plays out inthe remainder of this paper.
44
Wnters vympathetic to these kinds of arguments include John B_ Mitchell, "Reasonable Doubts
arc \\ hcrc You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's
'Different lission" 107), I Geo. J. Legal Ethics 339, EleanorW Myers and Edssard D. Ohlbaum,
"Di,,rediting the Truthful Witness: Demonstrating the Reality of Adversary Ad\ ocacy" (2000), 69
Fordharn L. Rev 1055;,
Dasid N Yellen, "'Thinking Like a LawNver' or Acting Like a Judge?: A
Response to Professor Simon" (1998), 27 Hofstra L. Re%. 13; John Hall, Jr., ProfessionalResponsihiti ,4the Crniinal Laiitnr, 2nd ed., looseleaf(Deerfield, Ill.: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1996)
at 1319.9: Charles W. \ulfram, tldcrn Legal Ethics (St. Paul, Minn. \\est Publishing. 1986) at 650SI, Hutchinson, supra note 18 at 154, Alan Gold, "Abuse of Power by the Defence Bar," TheAbuse
oJ Po i r and the Role ,,an Independent Judicial System in its Regulation and Control, [ 1979] Spec.
Lect. L S.U.C. 617 at 637-39; Michel Proulx & David Layton. Ethics and Canadian Criminal Law
(Toronto: Irwin Laxs. 2001) at 59-65 Gavin MacKenzie, Lait-'ers and Ethics. Professional Responsibilii'and Ditcipline, looseleaf(Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1993) at 7.4. William Smart, "Crossexamination it the Trial ot a Guilty Client", [2003] National Criminal La\s Program, 07.1. The
leading judicial comment on point, by Justice " hite in US i W~ade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967),
suggests that defence counsel may have a duty to aggressi\ elycross-examine a truthful witness, and
is heavily relied upon by the commentary to ABA Defense Std. 4-7.6(b), supra note 37.
45
Contrast the position of Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith, who suggest that counsel must
argue to the jury that the complainant in Wt consented. Presumably, their argument is that otherwise the JUrs will pick up on the failure of counsel to do so, assume that counsel beliexes the client
to be guilty and convict xxithout properly applying the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Monroe A. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lavi-vers'Ethics, 2d ed. (Newark, N.J.:
LexisNexis, 2002) at 216, n 8.
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tion is that if the lawyer uses knowledge of guilt obtained from the client
to restrict the defence, then clients will quickly learn that they cannot be
completely candid vith their lawyers without risking adverse consequences.
Whether guilty or innocent, clients will react by withholding information
from their lawyers. to the general detriment of their defences.4" Moreover,
in cases NNhere a Crown witness is in fact truthful the lawyer will never
learn of this from the client and an aggressive cross-examination will
occur in any event. In other words, forbidding aggressive cross-examination will do nothing to stop the practice, while hampering the quality of
defence work in cases where the issue does not even arise. 47
Not surprisingly, there are counterarguments - arguments for the
position that aggressive cross-examination is unethical.4" First, the
practice runs a serious risk of misleading the finder of fact by suggesting
that the complainant is not telling the truth. Granted, defence counsel does
not actually say that the complainant is lying, and frames the final submissions in terms of a failure by the Crown to meet its heavy onus. But a jury
may not appreciate this distinction. Maybe the right to test the Crown's
case through cross-examination must therefore stop at the point where
counsel knowingly risks misleading the trier of fact, just as the right to

46. It is worth pointing out that. while there is undoubtedl, an intuitive appeal to the argument that
reducing protection for client confidences %%ill lead client, to be less candid with their lawy ers,
there
is scant empirical e%idence to support the contention as a blanket proposition (see e.g. Swindler &
Berlin v:LnttedStates, 524 U.S 399 ( 1998); Fred C_Zacharias, "Rethinking Confidentiality" (1989)
74 Iowa L. Rev. 351 ).I am willing to accept on faith that no protection whatsoever would hase a
substantial negative impact on the amount of information given by clients to la%%
yers. But I am not
open to the contention that any and ever reduction in protection will have such an impact, or will
have an unacceptably detrimental impact.
47. The key proponent of this argument is Monroe Freedman, whose early views on the subject are
found in ProfessionalResponsibility. supra note I For his current views, see Freedman & Smith,
supra note 45, c. 8. Some colleagues with Ahom I have raised this hypothetical tell me that they
intentionally conduct interviews so as to prevent the client from disclosing guilt. This response
clashes with Professor Freedman's reasoning It also implicitly concedes that knowledge of guilt and thus of the truth of the complainant's allegations - places restrictions upon the manner of crossexamination. In any event, a strong case has been made that selective ignorance on the part of the
lawyer is not aconvincing response to this problem (ibid. at 153-54, 22 1-22).
48. See e.g. Harry 1.Subin, "The Criminal Lawyer's 'Different Mission': Reflections on the 'Right'
to Present a False Case" (1987) I Geo. J. of Legal Ethics 125; Harry I. Subm, "Is This Lie Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense" (1988), I Geo, J. of Legal Ethics
689; Robert P. Lawry, "Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central Moral
Tradition of Lawyering" (1996), 100 Dickinson L. Rev. 563, Simon, Practice ofJustice, supra note
18, c.7; William H. Simon, "The Ethics of Criminal Defense" (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1703; William H. Simon, "'Thinking Like a Lawyer About Ethical Questions"' (1998) 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 1;
William H. Simon, "'Thinking Like a Lawyer'- About Ethics" (2000) 38 Duq. L. Rev. 1015; Rhode,
Interests of Justice, supra note 18 at 103.
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make tll answer and defence does not allow a lawyer to bribe a witness or
intentionally present perjured evidence."
As for the argument that aggressive cross-examination serves the
syrstemic purpose of checking state power and protecting the innocent,
perhaps this misses the point in a case where defence counsel knows the
Crown has presented truthful evidence and there is no risk of a wrongful
conviction. Applied in these circumstances, aggressive cross-examination arguably impedes the state's ability to convict the guilty without
affording any significant protection to the innocent."'
Finally, it is vital to emphasize a critical part of the calculus, which is
that aggressive cross-examination causes direct prejudice to the complainant. It suggests that she is a perjurer, causes her emotional upset and harms
her reputation. And there is a broader harm as well, because the practice is
likelv to discourage other genuine victims from coming forward.
Different people may find one set of arguments more compelling than
the other. I would guess that many members of the public, perhaps even a
majority, would be opposed to aggressive cross-examination.5' My
experience in teaching legal ethics is that, leaving aside for a second the
loaded issue of sexual assault complainants, students are split in their views
as to xhether a lawyer should aggressl\ ely cross-examine the witness who
is known to be truthful.5" Practicing defence la\x\ers are more likely to
favour permitting an aggressive cross-examination, which as a general
proposition is my \ lex as well. But I grow uncomfortable with the
suggestion that evei-v counsel must alwavs conduct an aggressive crossexamination wvhenever it is in the client's best interests to do so. After all,
ethical codes do not clearly mandate this result. But if defence counsel is
to have some discretion, how is it to be exercised? I want to return to the
sexual assault scenario and look at some different proposals.
A suggestion that has spawned much debate in the United States comes
from Professor David Luban of Georgetown University. Luban appears

49 That is,
the fact that due process rights are important in the criminal justice s',stem does not
mean that the search for truth is unimportant or is a\ a\ strumped. Note, however, that this argument carries less
force x here the trier of fact isa judge, gi\en that a judge iseminently able to
appreciate the distinction mentioned in the text abo\ e.
50. Sec Simon, Practe of Jutt c,supra note 18 at 175.
51. While I belie,,e that public opinion should be taken into account in de\ eloping a legal ethic, the
focus should be on the view of a reasonable la\,person who is knossledgeable about the principles
underlying the criminal justice system.
S2. Students interested in practising criminal law, whether for the defence or the Crown, are much
more likely to reject a rule that categorically bans aggressive cross-examination. Some of these
criminal law aficionados become uncomlortable with the practice, however, in the context of the
sexual assault hypothetical.
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prepared to accept tile agrcssi\ e cross-examination of a truthful witness
In some circumstances, oil the basis that the ability to attack the Crown
case isa necessar\ check on the abuse of state power. 3 But he argues that
the cross-examination Isalways unethical where the result would be to
further an institution that "poses chronic and persistent threats to
indiv idual well-being, threats that are an inherent part of the institutional
culture and not just an accident of human \ ickedness."' 4 When it comes to
cross-examining the truthful sexual assault complainant, Luban therefore
says that the defence la\\',er must take into account not only the need to
protect the accused against the poxerful state, but also the patriarchal
network of cultural expectations and practices that engenders and encourages male sexual violence. He concludes that the cross-examination should
not be aggressi\e, because defence counsel must respect the need to
protect truthful female victims of sexual assault.5 5To hold otherwise would
deter women from reporting rapes and perpetrate the myth that women
frequently invite sexual advances or lie about them occurring."
Luban's \,ie\\ has met with the objection that the lawyer is imposing
his or her moral or political \ ie\s on the accused. His critics argue that
any given laxv ver could use Luban's "threatening institution" test to justify

In 'Partisanship. Betrayal and Autonom. in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen
53
N) 90 Colum. L. Re\, 1004 at 13 1 [Luban. "'Partisan,ip"], Luban sasN that he would
Ellmann" ( I0t
-'reluctantlx', permit aggres'ise cross-e\ammation as long as it does not violate his "institutional
threat" standard. In his subsequentl, published article. "\re Criminal Defenders Different?" ( 1993)
91 \ich. L. Re\. 1729 at 1762. he seems less comfortable %%iththe practice, stating "Iam ambivalent
about the propriety of arguing that the e\ idence supports conclusions that I know are false and even
more ambivalent about impeaching truthful " itnesses. particularly in way's calculated to damage or
humiliate them. in mi viewi this is perhaps the moit difficult olall dilemmas ,fadvoc a, l" (emphasis
added).
'4. Luban, "Partisanship," ibid. at 1021). n. 90.
55. One su,,pectsthat this N,iew hold, attraction for Richard Devlin, given his comments supra note
18 at 935 Note that Luban's earlier position, formulated prior to the establishment of rape shield
laws. was that aggressive cross-examination aimed at bringing out the complainant's prior sexual
history would be unethical even in cases where she lalcll denies having consented. See Luban,
Lai, iers and Justice, supra note 18 at 151-52. He %iewed the deleterious chilling effect on the
reporting of sexual assaults by \ictimized women as outweighing an,, harm done to the innocent
accused.
56. For a somewhat analogous approach, see the work of Anthony Alfieri. Professor Alfieri generally supports zealous advocacy by criminal defence counsel, but he draws the line where the lawyer's
conduct perpetuates racial stereotypes or exploits racial difference; see "Defending Racial Violence"
(19951 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301; "Lynching Ethics Towards a Theory ofRacialized Defenses" (1997)
95 Mich. L. Rev. 1063; "Race Trials" 11998) 76 Tex. L. Re%.1293. For countering views, see Robin
D. Barnes, "Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road Less Traveled"
(1996) 96 Colum. L. Rex. 788; Abbe Smith, "Burdening the Least of Us: 'Race-Conscious' Ethics in
Criminal Defense" (1999) 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1585.
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restrictions oil cross-examination in almost any case (e.g., all wealthy
clients fall within the exception, all high-level drug-dealing clients fall
\xithin the exception, no minority clients fall within the exception, no
police witnesses can be protected by the exception).57 Disturbed by the
oxert application of a lawyer's oxxn morality, some argue that aggressive
cross-examination must be implemented whenever it is in the client's best
interest. " In short, there's a duty to launch an attack. Others who make the
same criticism xxould nonetheless allo\\ laxx ers to choose never to represent individuals charged with sexual assault, so as to axoid ever having to
cross-examine the truthful complainant."
Professor William Simon of Stanford Unix ersitv similarly faults Luban's
approach on the ground that each individual lawyer's moral view will lead
to a different result. " But Simon generally opposes aggressixe crossexamination. Far from requiring the practice in every case, he would only
allo\x aggressix e cross-examination xxhere it would "subvert punishment
that, though required by laxk.is unjustly harsh and discriminatory in terms
of more general norms of legal culture."' Simon therefore encourages the
limited use of aggressix e cross-examination "in the interests of
justice," as a means to effect ad hoc or \\hat he calls "retail" nullification
of laws that lak \ crs \ iew as unjust. He \\ ould not allow aggressiv e crossexamination in my example. because there is nothing unjust about the
punishment meted out to male sexual assault offenders.
Simon beliexes that his proposal is preferable to Luban's because the

S7
\ central point in this paper is that I do not fully accept this criticism, x\hich is based on the
view', that a la" Nvcr's morality is irrelc\ant to the task of legal representation and mu.t alwass Li\e
Oa to the client's best interests provided that the law, er does not break the las
5,8
;c ,g. Stephen Ellmann. "Las.xering for Ju,ticc in a Flawed Democrats Book Re\ie\s of
Lattic, cusl Juadhi
ie. ,An Ethic al. 'udv by D. Luban" I I)Lill ( olum. L. Rev. 116 at 155-5. ABA
Standard\AI ( iimnalJustic, Defense Function. 3d cd. (1990), Std 4-7 7(b). Though not dealing

specifically \sith the cross-examination of the truthful witness. see also Abbe Smith, "Defending
Defending: The Case for L nniitigated Zeal on Behalf of People \x ho Do Terrible Thing." (2000) 28
Hof-itra L. Rev 925 at 9s-61 Professor Smith directly addrcsses the rape case example (and rejects
Luban' position) in "Rosie (Y Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education ofa Sensiti\e New
,\g Public Defender" (1993) 2X Harv. C.R.-'.L. L. Rex. I at 42-4s
59
SeeoFreedman & Smith, iqra note 45 at 167-68. In the current edition of his book, Professor
Freedman maintains his decision not to take on rape cases. but hi" co-author Abbe Smith states that
she continues to accept such ciscs. though she -does not ah aN.s find it easy to handle [them]." She
would only refuse to conduct an aggressixe cross-examination of the truthful rape complainant if
such a strategy as not advantageous to the client (ibid. at 2 x i.
60. Sec Simon, Prac tic e of.hiitiuc. upra note IS at 176-77. Professor Simon's s c\s are also set
out in "The Ethics of Criminal Defense" (11'9) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1703. and "Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense" l993) 91 Mich. L. Re\. 1767.
61
'see Simon, Praciiccflif(ti,,'. thid. at 189-90.
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la\\ yer is guided b\ basic \ alues underl\ing the justice system." 2 Crucially
for him, sentencing principles (e.g., a\ punishment must be reasonably
proportionate to the gravity of the crime) and anti-discrimination doctrine
(e.g., criminal laws should not disproportionately impose harsh punishment on minority groups and the poor) --not the lawyer's personal moralitv
pro\ ide guidance in deciding whether to undertake an aggressive
cross-examination" 3 Simon admits that this approach will lead to controversial decisions and discrepancies from lawyer to lawyer. Howe\ver, he
argues that strict universality of application is not the standard by which to
measure success. any more than it is the measure we apply to assess the
propriety of decisions made b\ police officers about when to arrest, Crown
counsel about when to prosecute and judges and juries about when to
convict.' Vhat is important is that on the whole lawycrs' decisions make
a positive contribution in terms of the legal \alues that we believe are
relevant.15 Indeed, the current lack of any clear direction in ethical codes
means that discrepancy from lax% er to la\x\ er is already the case. Simon
thus xie\s his proposal as being no worse than the present system while
prox iding a more con\ incing link to substanti\ e justice. 6
Where do I come down on the issue of cross-examining the truthful
sexual assault complainant? I should begin by saying that I have never
done so in circumstances \\here my client had admitted his guilt to me.
Nih hunch is that clients who wish to contest guilt are especially unlikely
to confess to their la\\vers in sexual assault cases. If this means that my
cross-examination may cause harm to a truthful complainant, so be it.
Unless I know that mv client i,guilt1.I am xilling to run the risk in the
course of fulfilling mv function as defence counsel in an adversarial, rightsbased criminal justice system. I should emphasize that, for me, kno\ ledge
in this context demands more than an objectively held belief beyond a
reasonable doubt. Gixen m\ role as loyal advocate, it means irresistible

62
For Luban's response. see "Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics" ( I)LN1 51 Stan. L Rev 873.
Luban stresses that his conception of a lawyer's personal morality draws extensiselv from principles
ofjustice imminent in the legal system He takes issue. however, with Simon's claim that personal
morait, is irrelevant to the process Ultimately. I prefer Luban's \ iew. although itmust be said that
the two academics share much common ground.
63. Some would undoubiedly argue that Simon's sies of"justice' stretches established legal
doctrine to such an extent that the result amounts to little more than an application of his personal view
(not the %iew of the courts) as to what is and is not.lust
64
See Simon, Practice qfJustice. supra note 18 at 191.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid. at 192.
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knowledge that even an honest partisan cannot deny, and will usually require a reliable admission of guilt from my client."
But if rny client did admit guilt to me, what would I do? If the prosecution case was overwhelming, I would probably advise him to plead guilty.
Not doing so, and conducting a futile aggressive cross-examination, would
risk alienating the judge and resulting in a higher sentence. The point here
is that I would never conduct an aggressive cross-examination if doing so
would be clearly against my client's best interests. My client would of
course be free to reject my ad\ ice on the advisability of a guilty plea, in
which case I would likely withdraw, because in my view the rejection would
represent a fundamental breakdown in the relationship. Admittedly, withdraw ing amounts to refusing to help the client exercise his constitutional
right to plead not guilty and test the Crown's case. But given my view of
the client's best interests, the breakdown in the professional relationship
and the uselessness of causing harm to the complainant, I can live with the
result.
Let's narrow my options further, and assume that the Crown's case is
not insurmountable and that aggressiv e cross-examination might conceivably lead to an acquittal. In this case, I draw a distinction between
challenging a complainant in a manner that suggests she is lying, and
challenging her so as to suggest that she may be mistaken. For instance, if
the identity of the perpetrator is the key issue, not consent, I would be
willing to cross-examine so as to suggest that her identification of my client is not sufficiently reliable to ground a conviction. Attacking the dependability of the identification suggests an unintentional mistake. It is
less problematic for me because I am not portraying the complainant as a
person of bad character who may be lying. My cross-examination causes
substantially less harm to her reputation, and creates much less of a disincentive for other victims of sexual assault to come forward.
But what if my client insists on pleading not guilty, in circumstances
\%,here attacking the complainant's character offers the only viable defence?
On this scenario, given the absence of unequiv ocal guidance from Cana-

67.

In this rcspcct, I take a different position from Simon, who %Nouldhave defence counsel refrain

from aggrcsi\e cross-eamination %%henever s,,he is of the \ ic% that his or her client was guilty
bcond a reasonable doubt (ibid at 173). For a more detailed discussion of the "knowledge" issue,
see Proul, & Layton, supra note 44 at 37-5 1.
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dian codes of professional conduct," I believe that every defence lawyer
should have discretion in determining how to respond. For my part, I would
consider the factors mentioned by Professor Luban, and would probably
decline to conduct an aggressive cross-examination. But I would borrow
from Professor Simon in approaching the issue in terms of relevant legal
values."9 The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the accused's
right to full answer and defence does not invariably trump the equality
rights of women.-" The Court has also held that an accused's right to crossexamine a complainant will be curtailed where the prejudicial impact
substantially outweighs any probative value.7" If a court can legitimately
balance these legal values in deciding a case, why can't I consider the
same values in making my choice? This is not to say that I should balance
the values in the same manner as would a court. That would be a grave
mistake, given that defence counsel plays a different role, and owes the
client a strong duty of loyalty, a duty that is not imposed on judges. But in
weighing the harm caused by aggressive cross-examination - something
that Canadian ethical rules surely allow defence lawyers to do - my view
of equality rights and prejudicial impact is certainly not irrelevant.7 2

68. There is another question here, one that I am more or less ducking in this paper: should law
societies amend ethical codes to narro,% a lauver's discretion? My tentative response is "no." For
one thing, I am fearful of overl\ detailed categorical rules that prevent laxNers from taking into
account the contingencies ofparicular situations encountered in practice. I am also attracted to an
approach where lawyers play an actise role in ethical decision-making, being of the view that one's
ethical compass works better when subject to frequent use. Moreover, knoing the ability of lawyers
to interpret legislation and codes in innovative \;ays. I am doubtful as to whether a black and white
rule %%illnecessarily lead to clarity in practice.
69- I must stress that. unlike Simon. in deciding whether to conduct an aggresix c cross-examination I would not confine myself to instances where the punishment following a conviction would be
unduly harsh or discriminatory. Nor would I use aggressixe cross-examination only to effect the ad
hoc nullification of lawts that I viewed as unjust. What is important in my view is that any lawyer
exercising the discretion to decide whether to conduct an aggressive cross-examination be guided by
the values underlying and informing our legal system, and in particular our criminal justice system.
70. In R. v. Hills ( 1999) 139 CC.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada held in the
context of an application for production of third party records that the right to full answer and defence does not necessarily trump the pn\ acy interest of a sexual assault complainant, and in doing so
held that the equality rights of women bear upon the proper balance between these sometimes conflicting rights. While it is hard to reconcile this decision with the earlier - and in my \iew preferable
- balance struck by the Court in R. v 0 Connor (1995), 103 C.C.C (3d) I (S.C.C.), what is important is that the right to full answer and defence may be tempered by countervailing values found in
the justice system.
71. See Shearing, supra note 12 at 251-52, 259-68.
72. Another possibility is that a lawyer concludes that his or her personal views render him or her
unable to conduct an effective aggressive cross-examination. In such a case, the lawyer would have
an obligation to withdraw on the ground that to stay on the case would impact adversely on the
client's best interests. This decision is in theory different from one where the lawyer refuses to
cross-examine because he or she thinks that it is wrong to do so, but the line between the two situations is thin indeed.
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I want to make clear, however, that if I decided against conducting an
aggressi\ c cross-examination I would have a duty to tell my client immediately. In other words, I could not simply proceed with the case, including
a tepid cross-examination, without informing him of the decision. A fair
forewarning would give my client time to react. He could choose to fire
me, or force me to wvithdraw by insisting on an aggressive cross-examination, and thereupon obtain a new lawyer. Or, perhaps less likely, he might
be persuaded by my position and decide to plead guilty. What is important
is that he not be saddled x ith a lawyer who conducts the case in a manner
fundamentally inconsistent \\ ith his wishes.
In different circumstances, I might have less compunction about
attacking the character of a truthful witness. Suppose my client is an
Aboriginal woman with a long criminal record \ ho shoplifts to help feed
a heroin addiction, and the truthful witness is a store security guard who
utters a racist comment while making the arrest. Our courts have recognized that special measures are needed to combat racism against Aboriginal people in the justice system' 3 and ha\e held that the adverse impact of
discrimination is something that can be taken into account in passing
sentence."4 Am I barred from looking to similar values in applying my
discretion in fa\ our of conducting the cross-examination? I don't think so.
Even more importantly to me, the aggressive cross-examination of the
sccurity guard would not promote inequality. If anything, it would have
the opposite effect. Harm caused by the cross-examination would thus be
considerably less than in the case of the truthful sexual assault complainant. Consequently. I would be prepared to attack the witness's character in
order to raise a reasonable doubt. Once again, in doing so I would merely
be taking action that is within the range of proper ethical behaviour,
motivated by my view that in the circumstances an aggressive crossexamination best reconciles my duties to my client and the administration
of justice.

Conclusion
As a defence lawyer, it is tempting for me to accept the view that my only
allegiances are to my client and the limits of the law. This keeps things
simple. It provides a positivist shield that absolves me of personal respon-

73. Scc c i. R. v Williams (1998), 124 C.C C (3d) 481 (S.C C.).
74 R. v Gladue(1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.); R. v Borde (2002), 172 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at
236 (Ont C.A.). But see also the recent decision in R. v. Hamilton, [2004] O.J. No. 3252 (C.A.) at
para
)9-11)0, 114-44
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sibility for the things that I do in the course of my work. The view that I
have argued for here is messier. If a criminal defence lawyer necessarily
applies a personal conception of shared professional values, if he or she
makes normative decisions that impact on the course of justice, the security offered by a strong version of role morality begins to erode. Charges
of moral relativism must be addressed. The comfort of categorical responses
is lost.
I am the first to admit that sometimes I'm slightly nervous with the
notion that my o\\ n moral compass - and not just the limits of the law
might restrict what I can do for a client. But surely this notion does no
more than depict the reality of my work. It does not mean that I betray my
clients or take on the role of judge or prosecutor. What it means is that I
necessarily make contextual, value-based choices when conducting a criminal defence. Usually, the result is that I resolutely represent my client, and
force the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sometimes,
however, resolute representation is not the only acceptable course of
action. Dilemmas may arise like the case of the truthful sexual assault
complainant, dilemmas that yield to no easy answer and perhaps more
than one right response. The trick is always to be morally engaged and to
assume responsibility for niv actions. That is what defence lawyering means
to me. And that, to answer the question posed at the beginning of this
paper, is how I live with myself.

